of 'consolidating' these instant democracies as well as more radical critiques of 'democratic imperialism', which argue that limited, unstable and 'choice-less' democracies have been produced, especially in Africa but also elsewhere. 5 The speci c question we need to ask, therefore, is if there are additional, and perhaps diVerent, lessons to learn from Southeast Asia.
The Philippine and Thai Debacles
What would be the best case to examine the experiences? The natural choice for rst candidate is the Philippines with its authoritarian tendencies but also, a long experience of liberal democracy. Here, the problem of 'consolidation' as well as the tendency towards shallow and uneven democratization are obvious. By 1986, the Philippine middle class was deprived of their electoral victory and, thus, gained mass support against Marcos' authoritarianism. An entire world was thrilled, but the outcome under Corazon Aquino was the resurrection of the traditional elitist cum boss democracy and under Fidel Ramos, additional and more eYcient structural adjustment. In the next presidential elections, therefore, populist and semi-nationalist Joseph Estrada could bene t from people's frustrations and win a landslide victory. The outcome, however, was misgovernance and abuse of public resources. So in early 2001, the undermining of the second pillar of the institutional channels of democracy (in addition to elections), open and accountable government, paved the way for a partly middle class cum business-led revolt. The only other major diVerence from 1986 was that Estrada had not (yet) lost as much mass support as had Marcos (who also undermined the constitutional rights). This was compensated for by the massive mobilization of the major parts of the radical Left that had not stubbornly invested in Estrada's populism 6 but nally, had learnt the lesson to defend rather than neglect democracy; some consistently and some, like the Maoists, for tactical reasons.
An obvious second candidate for study is Thailand, with its own waves of pro-democratic movements but also with serious setbacks. Just a few weeks before the recent debacle in Manila, for instance, Thailand's major business tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra won a landslide victory on the basis of an Estrada-like nationalist-populism, against a liberal middle class cum business and IMF sponsored 'post-1997-crisis regime'. The idealist NGO attempts at crafting new ambitious constitutional regulations against boss politics and vote buying did not help much. With fresh and massive backing, Thaksin himself has so far avoided legal disquali cation for having tampered with the new rules of the game. It is more likely that he will face similar problems later on, as did Estrada.
